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Measuring Justice in State Courts:
The Demographics of the State
Judiciary
Tracey E. George*
Albert H. Yoon**
For most individualsand organizations, state courts--especially
state trial courts-are the "law" for all effective purposes. State courts
are America's courts. But, we know surprisingly little about state court
judges despite their central andpowerful role in lawmaking and dispute
resolution. This lack of information is especially significant because
judges' backgrounds have important implicationsfor the work of courts.
The characteristicsof those who sit in judgment affect the internal
workings of courts as well as the external perception of those courts and
judges. The background ofjudges will influence how they make decisions
and can impact the public's acceptance of those decisions. We aim to
address this knowledge gap by collecting demographics on state judges
in every state. We discovered, however, that the task is extraordinarily
difficult due to many factors, including a lack of transparency and an
abundant complexity in our state court systems. In this Article, we
describe and evaluate the difficulty of studying state courts and the
importance of continued efforts to do so. We explain a variety of methods
to overcome some of the research challenges. We then lay out our findings
on state court demographics. The process and outcome of our project can
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inform study of the judiciary and its place in our political system. We
hope too they will encourageand facilitatefuture empiricalstudy of state
courts.
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INTRODUCTION

The selection of a new U.S. Supreme Court Justice was a central
issue in the 2016 presidential election.' Justice Antonin Scalia died
unexpectedly on February 13, 2016.2 President Barack Obama

1.
See, e.g., ABC News Analysis Desk & Paul Blake, Election 2016 NationalExit Poll Results
and Analysis, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:10 AM), http://abcnews.go.comfPoliticslelection-2016national-exit-poll-results-analysis/story?id=43368675 [https://perma.cc[NE62-V8NW] (reporting
that 21% of voters named U.S. Supreme Court appointments as "the most important factor" in
their choice of president in the 2016 election); Nina Totenberg, The Supreme Court: A Winning
Issue in the Presidential Campaign?, NPR (Sept. 29, 2016, 4:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2016/09/29/495960902/the-supreme-court-a-winning-issue-in-the-presidential-campaign
[https://perma.cc/BB9Z-FU78] (noting the controversy over the refusal to confirm Merrick Garland
and opining that the outcome of the presidential election could significantly impact the political
leaning of the Supreme Court).
2.
See, e.g., Eva Ruth Moravec, Sari Horwitz & Jerry Markon, The Death of Antonin Scalia:
Chaos,
Confusion and
Conflicting Reports,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
14,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-tv-station-scalia-died-of-a-heartattack/2016/02/14/938e2170-d332-1 1e5-9823-02b905009f99
story.html?utmterm=.450100ebc2c9
[https://perma.cc/QHV4-LHSQ]
(describing
the
circumstances of Scalia's death); see also Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States,
Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death of Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 15,
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nominated U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Judge Merrick
Garland to succeed Scalia.3 The Republican-controlled Senate,
however, refused to consider nominee Garland because Obama was in
his last year as president. 4 Although unprecedented and controversial, 5
the Republican Senate leadership's decision is logical. In an
appointment system with nomination and confirmation, the nominator
controls the agenda. A different nominator will present different
options to the confirming body. The country saw this play out. President
Donald Trump's eventual nominee, Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch,
had a much different judicial record than Garland.6
Any process of selection will inevitably have an impact on who
is selected. 7 The fifty-two judicial systems in the United States use a

2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_02-14-16
[https://perma
.cc/ZZT8-PGU7] (providing the Supreme Court Justices' reaction to Scalia's death).
3.
See, e.g., Remarks on the Nomination of Merrick B. Garland to Be a United States
Supreme Court Associate Justice, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 154 (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201600154/pdf[DCPD-201600154.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T5XQ-RTJ6] (introducing Garland and asserting that he should be given a fair hearing by the
Senate); Matt Ford, The Supreme Court Confirmation Battle Begins, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2016,
11:54 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/obama-supreme-court-nominee/
473784/ [https://perma.cc/R2C6-3G3N] (summarizing Garland's credentials and describing the
challenge Garland would face to be confirmed).
4.
See, e.g., Totenberg, supra note 1.
5.
See A Crippled Supreme Court's New Term, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/opinion/a-crippled-supreme-courts-new-term.html
[https://perma.cc/U3EV-U2D5] (disapproving of the Senate's refusal to confirm Garland and
describing the negative impact that the vacancy has had on the Supreme Court); Linda
Greenhouse,
The
Broken
Supreme
Court,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/the-broken-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/
GA2F-KRDZ] (opining that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court has been threatened by the
unorthodox and overly politicized way in which Scalia's vacancy was filled).
6.
Compare ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44778, JUDGE NEW M.
GORSUCH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME COURT (2017),

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44778.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EFK-LCZ3] (examining Gorsuch's views
on fourteen different areas of law and noting that his jurisprudence demonstrates many
similarities with Scalia's approach to these issues), with ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44479, JUDGE MERRICK GARLAND: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE

SUPREME COURT (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/miscR44479.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PF6-YESV]
(reviewing Garland's views on fourteen different areas of law and pointing out several differences
from Scalia's judicial approach). See also Adam Liptak, A Polarized Supreme Court, Growing More
So, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/us/politics/gorsuch-supremecourt.html [https://perma.cc/S2GY-4MEX] (noting the ideological differences between Gorsuch and
Garland and highlighting their differing views on the administrative state).
7.
The empirical literature demonstrating the impact of selection method, including who
chooses and in what context, is extensive. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); GREG GOELZHAUSER, CHOOSING
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: MERIT SELECTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM (2016); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
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wide variety of processes to choose their principal judges.8 The federal
judicial system uses two methods of selection: the familiar Article III
presidential nomination and Senate confirmation process, 9 and the less
familiar Article I administrative process. 10 Each state has a distinct
selection process for its judicial system. 1 A state judge may first gain a
seat through election (nonpartisan or partisan), appointment by an
elected branch (governor and/or legislature), or recommendation by a
merit commission. Because few state judges enjoy life tenure, most face
some form of election, either a retention election (with an up-or-down
vote) or a contested election, to keep their seats. 12
Judicial selection's effects extend beyond who is chosen to who
even considers becoming a candidate. Federal judges and judicial
nominees have complained of the discouraging effects of the slow and
sometimes demeaning gauntlet to confirmation. 13 They may drop out or
not even make themselves available as a prospective nominee. State
judges often face elections to be selected for, or at least to retain, a seat.
State judges express concern that the path to the bench via the ballot
box dissuades promising candidates, especially women and minorities,
from seeking judicial office and has negative effects on those that do. 1 4
8.

For a rich and thoughtful history of the evolution in state judicial selection systems, see

JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
AMERICA (2012).

9.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States . . . .").
10. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (providing for appointment of
bankruptcy judges to particular judicial districts after considering the Judicial Conference's
recommendations); Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (allowing for
appointment of magistrate judges by district court judges and setting forth requirements for
appointees).
11. See Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Selection & Retention of State
Judges: Methods from Across the Country, UNIV. DENVER (2017), http://iaals.du.edul
sites/default/files/documents/publications/selection and retention of state judges-charts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CH82-8SA5] [hereinafter IAALS Study] (detailing the selection methods for
selecting and retaining judges for all fifty states). The interstate variation is sufficient to justify
and support an interactive website that allows the user to select a state and then look at selection
at each level and for each type of court. See Judicial Selection in the States, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST.
CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us (last visited Sept. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AJ6W-WS9F].
12. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island judges have lifetime appointments.
IAALS Study, supra note 11, at 9.
13. See, e.g., Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, "ExtraordinaryCircumstances" The
Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposalfor JudicialNominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969
(2012) (looking at the use of the filibuster during judicial confirmations and proposing selfregulation of this political maneuver in the future); Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara
Schiavoni, Obama's Judiciary at Midterm: The Confirmation Drama Continues, 94 JUDICATURE
262 (2011) (examining Obama's nominations and appointments to the Supreme Court at midterm,
and discussing particular difficulties faced as well as potential missteps made in the process).
14. See, e.g., CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S.
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES (1997)

MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE
(considering how judges balance
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The work of courts as well as the public's view of courts and their
legitimacy are affected by who serves. The idea that judicial decisions
and their reception are affected by the identity of the person making
the decision is entirely intuitive and empirically well established. 15
Thus, we need to know the demographics of the bench to understand
the dynamics of the judicial process, to evaluate the means of choosing
judges, and to analyze the role of the judiciary in the larger political
system. 16 Judicial biographies are important.
The U.S. Supreme Court is undoubtedly the most visible and
well-known court in America. Countless scholarly and popular works
have been published on the Court and the individual Justices who have
served on it. 17 We can read colorful and extensive stories about their
lives: their upbringing, common or idiosyncratic habits, changing
worldviews, and life-altering experiences.1 8 We can access detailed
databases of their backgrounds, attributes, and work. 19 We can even
track down the gravesite for each Justice (only the dead ones, of

accountability to voters with judicial integrity and examining why some judges are more affected
by political influence than others); Sue Bell Cobb, I Was Alabama's Top Judge. I'm Ashamed by

What IHad to Do to Get There: How Money Is Ruining America's Courts, POLITICO MAG., Mar./Apr.
2015,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/judicial-elections-fundraising-115503
[https://perma.c/C559-A44B] (disapproving of the system of collecting donations and running
political ads in order to secure a judgeship).
15. See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009)

(examining the public's impression of the Supreme Court in the context of the nomination and
appointment of Justice Alito); Tracey E. George & Taylor Grace Weaver, The Role of Personal
Attributes and Social Backgrounds on Judging, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL

BEHAVIOR 286 (Lee Epstein & Stefanie Lindquist eds., 2017) (evaluating social background theory,
which suggests that judges' rulings are influenced by their personal experiences).
16.

See, e.g., SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY

MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2015) (positing that judges' personal characteristics
influence their rulings, and exploring the impact of diversity on both the U.S. Courts of Appeals
and the judicial process as a whole); SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE

JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER (2013) (considering the importance of gender studies in the judiciary
and political sphere and advocating for the appointment of female and feminist judges).
17. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-2012 (Clare
Cushman ed., 3d ed. 2013); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE

SUPREME COURT (1979). For a more humorous approach to judicial biography, see DOUG MAYER,
ANDY MAYER & JIM BECKER, THE SUPREME COURT: A PAPER DOLL BOOK (1993).
18. See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005); DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER
WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001); LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIs SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY (1983).
19. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 293-550 (6th ed. 2015);
SUP.
CT. DATABASE,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org
(last
visited
Sept.
16,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/3DQN-8RTC].
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course). 20 Even the relatively unimportant Justices have received lavish
attention. 2 1 Supreme Court Justices' lives lay open for us. Yet, the
Supreme Court, while important, has limited reach. The Court decides
fewer than one hundred cases per year. 22 Moreover, it addresses only
questions of federal law. While we often hear a person say that she will
take her case "all the way to the Supreme Court," the reality is that the
Justices decide few cases and only a subset of legal issues.
Although the Supreme Court is the top of the federal judicial
hierarchy, lower federal courts are the final word for nearly every
dispute. Plaintiffs and federal prosecutors brought more than 369,208
cases to U.S. district courts in the fiscal year ending September 30,
2016.23 And, 805,580 bankruptcy petitions were filed with U.S.
bankruptcy courts. 24 Adding a smattering of other categories of cases,
more than 1.5 million matters were brought to entry-level courts in the
federal judiciary between October 2015 and September 2016. Losing
parties filed appeals to the U.S. courts of appeals in about 60,000
cases.25
Famous jurists like Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand aside,
we know much less about the personal narratives of lower court judges
than we do about Justices, notwithstanding the central role of lower
federal courts in federal law. 2 6 Fortunately, the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC"), the research arm of the federal judicial branch, does maintain

20. See, e.g., George A. Christensen, Here Lies the Supreme Court: Revisited, 33 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 17, 25-30 (2008) (providing the graveyard names and addresses for deceased Supreme Court
Justices).
21. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Rufus W. Peckham and Economic Liberty, 62 VAND. L. REV.
591 (2009) (describing in detail Justice Peckham's professional background, professional career,
and judicial legacy). For an argument that there are no unimportant Justices, see David N.
Atkinson, Minor Supreme Court Justices: Their Characteristicsand Importance, 3 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 348, 348 (2014) (arguing that even the minor Justices who leave "no special imprint on the
public mind . . . are nonetheless worthy of intensive study").
22. Supreme Court of the United States-Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and Remaining on
Docket, U.S. CTS. tbl.A-1, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/supcourt-al_0930.2016.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https://perma.ccl24MM-Z5Y6] (reporting that the Court annually
heard oral arguments in 75 to 82 cases in October Terms 2011-2015).
23. U.S. District Courts-Judicial Business 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2016
(last visited
Sept.
16, 2017)
[https://perma.ccIW7TB-QREE].
24. U.S.
Bankruptcy
Courts-Judicial Business
2016,
U.S.
CTS.
tbl.6,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-bankruptcy-courts-judicial-business-2016
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ZX46-2J43].
25. U.S. Courts ofAppeals-JudicialBusiness 2016, U.S. CTS. tbl.1, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2016
(last visited Sept.
16,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/5CUP-WJDN].
26. For noteworthy exceptions to the sparse record on lower federal court judges, see DAVID
M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY, GREATEST JUDGE OF His ERA (2012); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (2d ed. 2011).
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a database of demographic variables of Article III judges. 27 Though it
lacks the richness of the many biographical portraits of the Justices, the
FJC database is detailed and complete with respect to every judge who
has served in an Article III position. (Unfortunately, the FJC lacks
comparable data for Article I judges such as bankruptcy judges and
magistrate judges. 28
State courts resolve nearly every dispute that is brought to the
judicial system, yet we lack comprehensive and reliable information on
state judges. For most people, state courts are where they can seek
redress of an injury, assistance with a problem, or the right to defend
against an accusation. Although state judges are public servants, little
is known about them. Unlike their counterparts on the federal courts,
much of the information on state judges is nonpublic and, in many
instances, not even collected in a systematic way. Given the large
number of state judges, we would not expect rich histories in
monographic form as we see for so many Supreme Court Justices. 29 But
there also is not a reliable research database of state judges. Instead,
there is an assortment of commercial and nonprofit print and online
resources for trying to track down information on judges. These sources,
we found, are uneven. Some are quite promising. Others are riddled
with errors. None is comprehensive or suitable for robust empirical
scholarship.
In order to address this serious shortcoming in our
understanding of America's courts, we have constructed an
unprecedented database of state judicial biographies. Our dataset-the
State Bench Biographical Database-includes more than ten thousand
current sitting judges on state courts of general jurisdiction. This study
is based on the work of a team of independent researchers at Vanderbilt
University and the University of Toronto. With financial support from
the American Constitution Society, the researchers collected and coded
biographical data on over ten thousand judges serving on state supreme
courts, state intermediate appellate courts, and state general
jurisdiction trial courts. Using the State Bench Biographical Database,
we examine the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of state courts.
27. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https://perma.ce/TT4F-5ZCZI;
BiographicalDirectory of Article HI Federal Judges: Export, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/judges/biographical-directory-article-iii-federal-judges-export (last visited Sept. 16, 2017)
[https://perma.ce/4BR9-ULE3].
28. Cf. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Article I Judges in anArticle III World: The Career
Path ofMagistrateJudges, 16 NEV. L.J. 823, 836-43 (2016) (presenting data on magistrate judges).
29. The exceptions to this statement prove the rule, as they say. See, e.g., BEN FIELD,
ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J.

TRAYNOR (2003).
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We then compare the composition of state courts to the composition of
the general population in each state. We find that courts are not
representative of the people whom they serve-that is, a gap exists
between the bench and the citizens.
Our Article proceeds as follows. We begin in Part I with an
explanation for why empirical research on state courts and judges is
important. Part I offers an overview of the workload, structure, and
selection methods of state courts. In Part II, we describe our method for
tackling the challenges to studying the demographics of state
judiciaries. Part III presents our results. We conclude by considering
the implications of our project for research in this area.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON STATE COURTS
The current Symposium issue is dedicated to empirical research
on state courts. State courts are an important area of quantitative study
for several reasons. First, they are the principal source of judicial
decisionmaking in the United States. State judges are America's judges.
Second, state courts afford invaluable opportunities to test the effects
of institutional design on judicial decisionmaking because of the
tremendous diversity in state court systems.3 0 Third, state courts reveal
a great deal about the work of lawyers and the impact of law on the
microlevel. 31 They tell us more than federal courts, even U.S. district
courts, about what is happening locally in the law. Finally, state courts
are the most important protector of individual rights and liberties
because of their caseloads, their presence, and their availability. 32 As
we discuss in this Section, their central role combined with interstate
and intrastate variation in institutional design makes state courts an
incredibly rich and important focus for scholarly attention.

30. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View
from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 21-25 (1995) (analyzing the impact of institutional
design on judicial decisionmaking across eight states); Gbemende Johnson, Executive Power and
Judicial Deference: Judicial Decision Making on Executive Power Challenges in the American
States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 128, 130 (2015) (explaining the value of comparative study of state courts
to answer research questions about courts).
31. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 236-56
(1960); Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda
and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267, 299-300 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler,
The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121 (1977); Robert A.
Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The Evolution of State
Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 998-1001 (1978).
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A. The CentralRole of State Courts
State courts are open to the full range of disputes that arise in
this country. State judicial systems are courts of "general jurisdiction,"
which means they can hear questions of state and federal law. By
contrast, federal courts are courts of "limited" jurisdiction, which means
that they can only hear subjects assigned to them by the U.S.
Constitution or federal statute. 33
Americans are primarily concerned with matters such as
finances, family, health, and safety. State courts have authority over
these basic matters of daily life. If a tenant refuses to pay rent and her
landlord threatens to evict her, a state court would hear the dispute. If
divorced parents fight over the custody of a child, a state judge will
resolve the matter. If a car accident leaves a passenger badly injured,
the victim will likely go to state court to seek recovery. If a suspect is
arrested for assault, a state judge will hold the arraignment and
eventually preside over the trial (or more likely take the plea bargain).
The work of courts in America is the work of state courts.
State courts handle more than 90% of the judicial business in
America. According to the Court Statistics Project, a joint effort of the
National Center for State Courts and the Conference of State Court
Administrators, approximately eighty-six million cases were brought in
American state trial courts in 2015.34 In a single year, nearly one case
was filed for every three people in the United States. Roughly one
billion cases entered the state judicial system over the past decade.
Figure 1 shows the total incoming cases by type in 2015.

33.

See U.S. CONST. art. III,

§

2; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 39-

40 (7th ed. 2016).
34. Court Statistics Project, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Overview of 2015 State
Court Caseloads, CONF. ST. CT. ADMINS. & NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 3 (2016),
http://courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC%202015.ashx
[https://perma.cc/
7HZ2-9J3D].

1896

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:6:1887

FIGURE 1: TOTAL INCOMING CASES IN STATE COURTS,

2015

Family
6%

Juvenile
1%

The single largest category of state court cases is traffic
violations, making up more than half of state courts' caseloads. Traffic
violations are in many ways minor matters, requiring limited time and
relatively few court resources. Nevertheless, they can have meaningful
implications for individuals who face the possibility of fines and loss of
their right to drive. 35 Family law and juvenile matters, both of which
have obvious and profound effects on those involved, make up the
smallest part of state court dockets. Traffic, domestic, and juvenile
cases are usually heard by specialized courts, which hear only those
types of cases.
The most significant part of state court dockets consists of
criminal prosecutions and civil actions. Together, civil and criminal
cases account for nearly all nontraffic cases in state court. Civil and
criminal suits also are more likely to have effects beyond the parties to
the case. Judicial decisions in civil and criminal cases interpret law,
create precedent, and even make law. Civil lawsuits involve the
distribution of resources and recognition of rights that can have both
direct and indirect effects throughout the economy and society.
Criminal prosecutions bring the power of the state to bear on
individuals, acknowledge serious harms suffered by victims, punish
wrongdoers, and deter future criminal behavior.

35. See, e.g., Maura Ewing, Should States Charge Low-Income Residents Less for Traffic
Tickets?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/trafficdebt-california-brown/526491/ [https://perma.cclBJM5-95ES] (presenting the argument that
traffic ticket charges should vary based on income because of their disproportionate impact on lowincome individuals).
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B. Interstate and Intrastate Variation in State JudicialInstitutions
Each state judicial system is unique, yet certain patterns
emerge.36 All states have a trial level and at least one appellate level.
Trial courts include any court that handles cases when they are first
filed. An appellate court reviews decisions of lower courts. Forty-five
states have more than one type of trial court (a "divided" trial court
structure): a trial court of general jurisdiction and one or more trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. Specialized entry-level courts include
family courts, juvenile courts, municipal courts, small claims courts,
traffic courts, and other courts whose authority is similarly limited to a
defined, narrow subject area. In those states, trial courts of general
jurisdiction handle civil lawsuits (usually above a minimum-dollar
amount threshold) and criminal prosecutions for felonies or other
serious crimes. Six states use a single (or "unified") trial court to handle
all matters, although the unified court systems may handle the work
through divisional sittings, which hear particular types of claims. 37
State judicial systems handle review of lower courts in a number
of ways. Two general features are common. First, every state has at
least one appellate court of last resort-the final word on state lawwhich we will call a "supreme court" for ease of reference. Two statesOklahoma and Texas-have two such courts, one for civil appeals and
one for criminal appeals. Second, forty states, like the federal courts,
have an intermediate appellate court situated between general
jurisdiction trial courts and the high court(s). 38 An intermediate

36. The descriptions and data in this Section are based on our original research into primary
sources, including the individual court webpages for each state court. Similar data has been
compiled in other sources as well. See infra note 42. We collected the data directly rather than
relying on secondary sources in order to capture all of the nuances and idiosyncrasies present in
each state's system and to note when the structures and/or selection methods changed. We have
simplified the structures for purposes of description here. But in later work we will rely on the
variation in institutional design as part of an effort to explain the variation in composition and
work of the courts.
37. A single set of trial courts (unified) are in place in California, the District of Columbia,
Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Vermont. (We do not include probate courts as specialized entrylevel courts for this purpose.)
38. The jurisdictions without intermediate appellate courts in 2014 were Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. On November 4, 2014, Nevada citizens voted to amend the
state constitution to create an intermediate appellate court that began hearing cases in January
2015 (after our dataset closed).
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appellate court enables the state supreme court to hear fewer cases and
to exercise discretion over those cases that it does hear.
FIGURE 2: STATE COURT STRUCTURES
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Each state has a distinct selection process for its judicial system.
Many states use more than one method of selection. They may have an
unusual pairing of selection method and retention method. Selection of
trial court judges may vary by county. 39 The variation in judicial
selection among and within states makes it difficult to talk about state
courts collectively. By focusing on the most salient features of those
selection systems, however, the states can be grouped into helpful
categories.
A state judge may first gain a seat through election (nonpartisan
or partisan), appointment by an elected branch (governor and/or
legislature), or recommendation by a merit commission. The majority of
states (forty-three) and the District of Columbia use the same method
for selecting trial judges and appellate judges. All but two states use

39. The variation in selection of trial judges adds a wrinkle to the empirical study of the work
of state courts. In order to allow easier comparison at the general level, we categorize a state's
method of selecting trial judges based on the method used for most judges. Missouri, which is so
strongly associated with the merit selection method that it is often called the "Missouri Plan," only
uses merit nominating committees in certain counties. Five counties, Kansas City, and St. Louis
have adopted the Missouri Plan. (Greene County, which encompasses the state's third largest city,
adopted the plan as recently as 2008.) See Nonpartisan Court Plan, MO. CTS.,
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297 (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https:/perma.cc/ VB2C7MWJ]. Likewise, in neighboring Kansas, 17 of 31 districts use a merit selection process while the
remaining 14 use partisan elections. See Nominating Commissions, KAN. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.kscourts.org/appellate-clerk/nominating-commission/default. asp (last visited Sept.
16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F2YV-8YC2].
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the same method for all appellate judges. Most states use elections to
staff their trial courts. By contrast, the majority of state appellate
courts are filled using some type of appointment process, which can
involve a merit commission controlling the slate of nominees or allow
the appointing body (either or both elected branches) to select anyone
whom they choose.

FIGURE 3: SELECTION METHOD BY COURT LEVEL
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The maps in Figures 4 and 5 reveal some patterns in judicial
selection method. The American heartland favors choosing judges
through a merit process, while the North and the South generally favor
election, either partisan or nonpartisan. 40 The Northeast and the West
lack a clear pattern of selection. The key distinction between merit
selection and election is citizen participation. The merit process usually
requires that the governor, with or without consent of a legislature, pick
from a panel of nominees. Election may require party nomination before
a vote in a general election.

40. If a state uses a different method for selecting supreme court judges and intermediate
appellate court judges, the appellate judge map reflects the state's method of selecting supreme
court judges. The maps reflect the method used by the state in 2014. Several states have changed
their methods of selection since 2014.
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FIGURE 4: METHOD OF SELECTING STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES
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FIGURE 5: METHOD OF SELECTING STATE APPELL-ATE COURT JUDGES
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Finally, nearly every American state judge has a limited term.
Judicial terms can be as short as four years or as long as fifteen. Three
states grant life tenure with a mandatory retirement age of seventy.
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New Jersey grants life tenure if a judge is renewed after an initial
seven-year term. Retention otherwise involves reappointment by an
election official (or officials) or a commission, a retention election, or a
competitive election.
The great power wielded by this diverse set of judicial
institutions makes them an important subject of study. We can learn
directly about these courts but also better understand adjudication
generally as well as the role of the state and the nature of the law. But,
to study state courts, we need access to essential data about them.
II. DESIGNING A DEMOGRAPHIC STUDY OF STATE COURTS
Our study focuses on all appellate courts and general
jurisdiction trial courts. General jurisdiction trial courts include all trial
courts in unified systems and general jurisdiction courts in a divided
system. We limit our study in this way for two reasons. First, all states
have both of our selected types of courts, reflecting their centrality to
judicial systems. Second, the unique aspects of specialized courts make
comparisons across jurisdictions inapposite. We will refer to the trial
courts in our study as "trial courts," even though most bear another
name, and their judges as "trial judges," even though they often have a
different name. Similarly, we will refer to judges on any appellate court
as "appellate judges," although they too go by a range of names. Finally,
we refer to the highest court(s) in a state as the state supreme court(s).
We collected biographical data for every judge sitting on a state
appellate court or a state trial court of general jurisdiction as of
December 2014. Our dataset includes more than ten thousand judges.
When constructing our dataset, we used only sources that had the
hallmarks of credibility and reliability. The sources included state
government webpages, press releases, and directories; professional
association, practitioner, and university publications; academic
journals; newspapers; judges' official campaign websites; judicial and
legal directories; and confidential telephone interviews with judges and
lawyers. We used multiple sources to collect as complete a dataset as
possible and to confirm the accuracy of biographical information that
we found. We also used multiple methods to collect the information:
data scraping, hand coding, and interviews.
The process of compiling the data was time intensive. Along with
a team of six research assistants, we spent more than a year locating,
coding, cleaning, and checking the data. We ran repeated reliability
checks. We then sought to fill gaps by contacting practitioners and
judges who might help.
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The judge-centered database includes basic demographic
variables. For each judge, we coded full name, title, court, city,
education, gender, race/ethnicity, and age. With a few exceptions, we
are not directly observing these characteristics of the judges but rather
collecting it from secondary sources. Additionally, even after
exhausting available sources, we are missing race and ethnicity data on
roughly 5% of the judges, and we are missing age and education on a
larger portion. We identified gender for nearly all the judges in the
database. Our estimates are based on available data. Third, the
database includes only judges who were listed as serving on a relevant
state court in December 2014. If a state experienced significant
turnover in its composition of judges since the end of 2014, our figures
may contrast with the state's current judicial composition.
We computed the demographics of each state's population as a
benchmark for our state court demographics. The U.S. Census Bureau
collects annual population demographics. The product-the American
Community Survey-provides data that can be used to compute
demographic estimates for every state and region. 4 1 We drew on the
American Community Survey to construct our benchmarks.
A truly representative judiciary would have the same ratio of
women and minorities on the bench as it does in the general population.
We calculate a "representativeness score" for every state. This score is
the percentage of full representation achieved by the state. If a state is
fully representative, its score will be 100% or 1.00.
Because we also want to focus on the shortfall for each state, we
calculated the gap between the representation of women or minorities
on the bench and the representation of each group in the general
population. The "gavel gap" is how much the state falls short of that
forecast. We calculate the gavel gap by dividing the difference between
the proportion of women (or minorities) on the bench and women (or
minorities) in the general population by the proportion of women (or
minorities) in the general population. The formula for women would be
((fraction of judges who are women - fraction of general population who
are women) / fraction of general population who are women). Thus, if
half of a state's judges were women and half of its general population
were women, the state would have no gap ((.50 - .50) / .50 = 0). If 10%
of a state's judges were women and half of its general population were
women, the state would have a gap of -.80 ((.10 - .50) / .50 = -.80). That
is, the state has 80% fewer women on the bench than we would have

41.

American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-

surveys/acs/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cclJ5J4-HVQF].
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predicted based on its general population. Stated differently, the state
has only 20% of the number of women on the bench as we would expect.
III. THE RESULTS
The State Bench Judicial Database reveals a number of
noteworthy trends. 42 First, state benches are overwhelmingly white,
but a few states have achieved diversity on the bench consistent with
the diversity of their populations. Second, men are overrepresented on
state courts, and no state has achieved gender parity in its courts.
Third, and not surprisingly given the first two trends, white men cast a
long shadow over state courts. Fourth, the gap exists at every level of
the judiciary.
A. Trend 1: State judges are overwhelmingly white.
People of color make up roughly four in ten people in the country
but fewer than two in ten judges; and, in sixteen states, judges of color
account for fewer than one in ten state judges. The story of racial
diversity in state courts is one of sharp contrasts. In the five states with
the best representation, minorities are represented at roughly the same
rate or higher on state courts as they are in the general population
(representativeness score in parentheses): Montana (.54), South Dakota

(.41), West Virginia (.13), Hawaii (.03), and Wyoming (-.03). But, in the
five states with the worst representation, minorities appear to be nearly
absent from the judiciary: Alaska (-.95), Maine (-1.0), New Hampshire
(-1.0), North Dakota (-1.0), and Vermont (-1.0).
TABLE 1: RACE/ETHNICITY BREAKDOWN OF ALL STATE COURTS

(2014)
Percentage
White NonHispanic

Percentage
African
American

Percentage
Hispanic

Percentage

All State
Court
Judges

.8036

.0722

.0544

.0698

U..

.6172

.1238

.1766

.0824

Population

Other Race

The racial and ethnic representativeness of state courts data
reveals a fairly flat distribution for ethnic representation on state

42. The full database and rankings of the states are available at THE GAVEL GAP,
http://gavelgap.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cclG3FU-UMZN].
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courts. In a near majority of states (twenty-four), minority judges fell
below 50% of proportional representation of the general population.
This greater than .50 gap occurred in states with large minority
populations as well as those with small ones. In California and Texas,
for example, we would expect a large number of judges of color given
the number of people of color in each state: 62% of Californians and 56%
of Texans. But, we find instead that 26% of California judges and Texas
judges are people of color. In Iowa, we expect a small fraction of judges
to be people of color (13%), but the Iowa judiciary still comes in below
that forecasted percentage with only 6%.
We can better understand the racial and ethnic gap between who
lives in the United States and who sits in judgment by focusing on
different regions of the country. The U.S. Census divides the country
into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. We use those
regions as they allow comparison to other data collected on a regional
basis.
TABLE 2: POPULATION BY CENSUS REGIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
REGION
P
Percentage of
States in region
U.S. Population
NORTHEAST
56,283,891
17.5%
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont

MIDWEST

67,907,403

21.1%

121,182,847

37.7%

76,044,679

23.7%

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Wisconsin

SOUTH
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West
Virginia

WEST
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington,
Wyoming

We find meaningful regional effects for race and ethnicity of
judges. The South and the West, which have higher numbers of racial
and ethnic minorities than the Northeast and Midwest, do not have
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comparably higher numbers of minority judges. 43 In fact, white, nonHispanics in the general population outnumber white, non-Hispanic
judges by about two to one in the South and West. The Midwest and
Northeast have a smaller gap. Racial and ethnic minorities were just
over 23% of the population in the Midwest in 2014 and almost 14% of
the judges.
FIGURE 6: RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF THE GENERAL POPULATION AND OF
STATE COURTS BY CENSUS REGION

I

~

19.742112.9
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SOUTH
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N Minority Judges

B. Trend 2: Women are underrepresentedon state courts.
Women have entered law schools and the legal profession in
large numbers for the last forty years, but are underrepresented on
state courts. Women comprise roughly one-half of the U.S. population
and one-half of U.S. law students. But, less than one-third of state
judges are women. In some states, women are underrepresented on the
bench by a ratio of one woman on the bench for every three or four
women in the state.

43. ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2011-2015 American Community Survey 5Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsflpages/
productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cclC4LH-BMJF] (select
"Add/Remove Geographies" and choose "State" from the drop-down list).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1906

[Vol. 70:6:1887

TABLE 3: GENDER BREAKDOWN OF ALL STATE COURTS (2014)
Percentage
Total
Percentage Male
FeaeNmr
Female
Number
All State Court
Judges
U.S. Population

.6978

.3022

10,295

.4927

.5073

321,000,000

Not a single state has women on the bench in the numbers
commensurate with their representation in the general population. In
many states, men are overrepresented by a factor of two to one. That is,
for nearly half of the states, women comprise fewer than one-half of the
forecasted number of state judges. For example, Mississippi has a
majority female population, but less than 18% of its state judges are
women. New England states generally exhibit higher proportional
representation than elsewhere, although individual states in other
regions-e.g., Nevada, where women comprise 50% of the general
population and 41% of state judges, and Oregon, where women
comprise 51% of the general population and 44% of state judges-rank
relatively high. Not a single state has as many women judges as it does
men.
TABLE 4: ESTIMATED GENDER BREAKDOWN OF STATE COURT JUDGES
BY REGION
Female Judges as a
Women as Percentage
Percentage of All
of PopulationGavel
Gap
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

Judges

ofPopulation

.3192
.2825
.2809
.3293

.5129
.5071
.5097
.5016

-0.3777
-0.4429
-0.4489
-0.3435

The very low gender representativeness scores demonstrate that
the steady gender balance in law schools has yet to translate to equality
on state courts. Women have been attending law school in large
numbers for the past forty years. In 1985, the percentage of first year
law students who were women crossed the 40% threshold and has been
around 50% since 1996.44 Nevertheless, no state has women on the
bench in the numbers commensurate with their representation in the
general population.

44. First Year
and Total J.D.
Enrollment by
Gender 1947-2011, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/contentldam/abaladministrativellegal-education and admissions
to_thebar/statistics/jdLenrollmentjlyr-total-gender.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2017) [https://perma.cc/4S5Q-WGSR].
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Many of the states that fared poorly on the gender score also
performed poorly on ethnic representation. For example, Oklahoma
ranks forty-first out of fifty-one on the gender score (with 50% female
population but only 21% women judges), and forty-sixth out of fifty-one
on the race and ethnic minority representation score (with 33%
minority population but only 8% minority judges).
C. Trend 3: White men dominate state courts.
White men fill state judgeships at nearly twice their numbers in
the population. More than half of state trial judges and state appellate
judges are white men according to the State Bench Database figures:
57% of trial judges and 58% of state appellate judges are white men.
According to 2014 census figures, however, white men make up only
30% of the population. Women of color are the most underrepresented
group. Women of color are 20% of the population but only 8% of the
bench; that is, only 40% of their relative numbers in the general
population.

60%

FIGURE 7: RACE AND GENDER IN THE POPULATION AND
ON THE STATE BENCH (TRIAL AND APPELLATE)
58%57%

50%
40%
30%

31%
26%

30%
20%
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22%
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1 2 9%

8% 8%
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D. Trend 4: Gender and racial disparity are significant on trial and
appellatecourts.
We find a number of significant structural differences between
state trial and state appellate courts, but we find a comparable gavel
gap on both. White men account for roughly equal numbers of trial and
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appellate judges on the state bench. Women make up a slightly larger
percentage of appellate judges, and all of this gain is from larger
numbers of white women serving as appellate judges.
TABLE 5: RACE AND GENDER BREAKDOWN OF ALL STATE COURTS

(2014)

State Appellate
Judges
State Trial
Judges
All State Court
Judges
U.S. Population

Percentage
WieWmno
White
Women

Percentage
Women of
Color

Percentage
White Men

Percentage
Men of Color

.5705

.0954

.2565

.0776

.5804

.1237

.2186

.0773

.5787

.1191

.2249

.0773

.3041

.1886

.3131

.1942

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

We find that America's judges are overwhelming white and
male. The State Bench Database findings have a number of important
implications worthy of further discussion and future exploration.
First, our courts must be representative to fulfill their purposes.
Our laws are premised in part on the idea that our courts will be staffed
by judges who can understand the circumstances of the communities
that they serve. 4 5 Our judicial system depends on the general public's
faith in its legitimacy.4 6 Both of these foundational principles require a
bench that is representative of the people whom the courts serve.47 The
intuition here is that because judges inevitably draw upon their own
experiences when deciding cases, the judiciary benefits when their
experiences draw upon a broader set of the population. Empirical
research has shown that social background, including race, ethnicity,
and gender, have measurable individual and group effects on judges. 4 8
45. For a discussion of the challenges of judicial representativeness, see Jennifer A. Segal,
Representative DecisionMaking on the FederalBench: Clinton's DistrictCourt Appointees, 53 POL.
RES. Q. 137 (2000).
46. See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 16 (discussing the impact of judicial diversity on
perceptions of the legitimacy of courts).
47. See Joy Milligan, Pluralismin America: Why JudicialDiversity Improves Legal Decisions

About PoliticalMorality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1209-10 (arguing that increasing the judiciary's
representativeness in terms of gender and ethnicity will enable the court to more effectively
account for competing viewpoints when making decisions).
48. See, e.g., Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCi. 37, 45 (2015) (finding
that judges with daughters consistently vote in a more feminist fashion on gender issues than
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Second, we need a better process for developing a pipeline of
women and minorities to serve as judges. 49 The question of the supply
of women and minorities to serve as judges is one of labor economics.
The bench should not reflect the bar but rather the public. However, the
courts are staffed by lawyers, and thus the availability of qualified
candidates is a limitation on the ability of states to fill the seats. While
the number of judges is small relative to the number of lawyers, it still
requires a meaningfully large pool of candidates. Corporations may
provide guidance on this matter, given their efforts to improve gender
and ethnic diversity on their boards of directors, notwithstanding an
underrepresentation of female and minority applicants.5 0
Third, judicial selection affects who serves. We need to
understand how selection systems explain the variation that we observe
between and across states. Does merit selection, election, and/or
appointment produce a more representative and balanced bench,
controlling for other possible explanations? And, if a specific method of
selection is less effective at achieving parity, what accounts for that
difference? Does campaign finance play a role in election states? Does
the size of the electoral region (district or statewide) affect outcomes?
Judicial selection in state courts remains underexplored, with some
arguing that efforts at nonpartisan selection may not improve judicial
decisionmaking.5 1 The challenge here is that the question is somewhat
judges who do not have daughters); Susan Welch, Michael Combs & John Gruhl, Do Black Judges
Make A Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCl. 126, 131-32 (1988) (finding that the presence of black
judges increases equality of treatment between black and white defendants regarding the decision
of whether to incarcerate).
49. For studies exploring the significance of pipeline issues to judicial diversity, see LINDA
MEROLA & JON GOULD, Improving Diversity on the State Courts: A Report from the Bench, CTR.
FOR
JUST.
L.
&
SocY
GEO.
MASON
U.
(2009),
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/DiversityReport2009_4F739E0E55910.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS6Y-7FFR]; CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, MONIQUE CHASE & EMMA GREENMAN,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE,
IMPROVING
JUDICIAL
DIVERSITY
(2d
ed.
2010),

http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/egacy/ImprovingJudicial Diversity_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8Q6-B7UC]; Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson & Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial
and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, JUDGES' J., Summer 2009, at 28,
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/
documents/Racial andGenderDiversity-onStat_8F60B84D96CC2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
MBU6-5Y6U].
50. Early evidence suggests that increasing diversity on corporate boards benefits the firm.
See, e.g., Toyah Miller & Maria del Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom:
Mediators of the Board Diversity-Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755, 775
(2009) (noting improvement in firm innovation and reputation); Tuan Nguyen, Do Female
DirectorsAdd Value?, 13 ECONOMICA 169, 176 (2017) (noting improvements in firm performance).
51.

See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN

HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS (2009) (arguing that nonpartisan, "objective," judicial appointments fail to increase the
quality or diversity of judges); Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy:
Probingthe Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 326 (2001) (contending that
critics of partisan judicial elections "underestimate the extent to which partisan elections have a
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overidentified: judicial selection affects who serves, but so too does the
pool of eligible lawyers (i.e., the pipeline).
Fourth, criminal justice reform has drawn increasing attention
from the left and right. One of the most important aspects of the
criminal justice system is the trial judges who monitor representation
and who interpret and enforce the laws. Trial judges are
overwhelmingly white. But, criminal defendants are disproportionately
nonwhite. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that in 2009 in
the seventy-five largest counties, nearly half (44%) of felony defendants
were non-Hispanic African Americans and nearly one-quarter (24%)
were Hispanic/Latino. 52 We estimate that more than three-quarters of
trial judges are white. As recently as May 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court
has found unconstitutional jury-selection practices that produce an allwhite jury. 53 Yet, the reality is that minority defendants face a nearly
all-white trial bench in many states.
The state court demographic data not only leads to important
questions like these, but the data also can be used as part of efforts to
answer questions about the work of courts. We typically control for
demographic characteristics of decisionmakers when studying their
work. The data makes it possible to introduce those same controls in
the study of state courts.
State judges are public officials who play a vital role in our
democracy, our economy, and our daily lives. This makes it of great
importance that we understand who they are and what they do. The
current project hopes to contribute to that effort.

tangible substantive component and overestimate the extent to which nonpartisan and retention
races are insulated from partisan politics and other contextual forces").
52. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243777, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 7 tbl.5 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/

fdlucO9.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEK2-USA3].
53. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).

